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Abstract. We embed a simple contracting model with ex-ante investments in
which there is scope for Court intervention in a full-blown open-ended dynamic setting.
The underlying preferences of both Courts and contracting parties are fully forward
looking and unbiased. Our point of departure is the observation that when Courts
intervene in a contractual relationship they obviously do so at the ex-post stage. This
introduces a natural tension between actual Court behavior and ex-ante optimal Court
decisions.
In a Case Law regime each Court is tempted to behave myopically because, ex-post,
this aords current extra gains from trade. This temptation is traded o against the
eect of its ruling, as a precedent, on future ones. We model the Statute Law regime
in an extreme way: no discretion is left to the Courts which behave according to xed
rules. This solves the time-inconsistency problem aicting the Case Law Courts, but
is costly because of its lack of exibility.
We nd that when the nature of the environment changes suciently often through
time the Case Law regime is superior, while when the environment does not change very
often the Statute Law regime dominates. Overall, our ndings support the view that
Case Law is superior in elds in which innovation, and hence change, is central (e.g.
nance), while Statute Law is superior in more slow-changing ones (e.g. inheritance
law).
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Law never is, but is always about to be. It is realized only when embodied in a judgment,
and in being realized, expires. There are no such things as rules or principles: there are only
isolated dooms. [...]
[...] No doubt the ideal system, if it were attainable, would be a code at once so exible and
so minute, as to supply in advance for every conceivable situation the just and tting rule.
But life is too complex to bring the attainment of this ideal within the compass of human
powers. | Benjamin Cardozo (1921).
At face value, US Supreme Court Justice Cardozo is a lot wiser than Italian legislators in
the following attempt to prescribe rules well beyond the powers of their \compass."
If the birth takes place during a railway trip, the declaration must be rendered to the
railroad ocer responsible for the train, who will draw a transcript of verbal declarations, as
prescribed for birth certicates. Said railroad ocer will hand over the transcript to the head
of the railroad station where the train next stops. The head of such station will transmit the
documents to the local registrar's oce to be appropriately recorded. | Law of the Republic
of Italy (2000)1
Even abstracting from such misguided attempts to ne-tune legislation, a key question
remains. Is the pragmatism of Case Law simply always superior to the rigidity of Statute
Law? Are there universes in which Statute Law is instead superior to Case Law?
After all Statute Law was the prevailing system throughout a substantial part of organized
1This the text of Article 40 of the regulations for registrar's oces, issued as Decree Number 393 of Novem-
ber 3rd 2000 of the President of the Republic of Italy. Regulations being issued to ensure the streamlining of
procedures, as prescribed by Article 2, comma 12, of Law Number 15 of May 1997 of the Republic of Italy.
Translation by the authors.
The original Italian text is: \Se la nascita avviene durante un viaggio per ferrovia, la dichiarazione deve
essere fatta al responsabile del convoglio che redige un processo verbale con le dichiarazioni prescritte per
gli atti di nascita e lo consegna al capo della stazione nella quale si eettua la prima fermata del convoglio.
Il capo della stazione lo trasmette all'uciale dello stato civile del luogo, per la trascrizione." The original
reference in Italian Law is: \Articolo 40, Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 3 Novembre 2000 n. 396.
Regolamento per la revisione e la semplicazione dell'ordinamento dello stato civile, a norma dell'articolo 2,
comma 12, della legge 15 maggio 1997, n. 127." See, for instance, http://www.normeinrete.it/Statute Law or Case Law? 2
human societies for many centuries after 529 AD.2 Is it then that the ascent of Case Law
is like a scientic discovery? It just was not known before the 11th or 12th century,3 and
those who discovered it and started using it became unambiguously better o; just like, say,
penicillin after 1929. Once one poses the question in these terms, surely the unambiguous
dominance view seems too simplistic to be nal.
Our goal here is to build a simple stylized model in which, depending on the value of
some signicant parameters, which can be interpreted as embodying the speed of social
and/or technological change, Case Law sometimes performs better than Statute Law while
the reverse can also be true. As a byproduct, our analysis also aords us some insight into
the dynamics of precedents in a Case Law regime.
There does not seem to be a general consensus as to whether the distinction we analyze
here between Statute Law and Case Law corresponds in any general way to the distinction
between Civil and Common Law, and we do not purport to resolve, or even fully describe,
the debate. It is tempting, however, to draw a parallel in this way since at least historically
Common Law relied on few, if any, statutes while Civil Law starts from a large body of
statutes rooted in Roman Law dating back to the sixth century. In both Common and
Civil Law the body of statutes has expanded dramatically through time (Calabresi, 1982),
which makes the parallel problematic, and \pure" forms of either system hard to identify
(Von Mehren, 1957, Ch. 16).4
However, we believe that our analysis has at least some normative implications concerning
the distinction between Civil and Common Law. This is because the gaps left open by the
Statute Book are lled by the Courts according to dierent criteria in the two systems. In a
Common Law regime the gaps are lled utilizing the body of applicable precedents, which is
what we model below. In a Civil Law system the gaps are lled by interpretation of the code.
At least in the world we model here, the use of precedents stands out as a more (economically)
ecient way to ll the gaps. Common Law adapts via the use of precedents, while Civil Law
2The \Corpus Juris Civilis," almost universally regarded as the origin of Statue Law, was issued by the
Byzantine Emperor Justinian I between 529 and 534 AD.
3The English system of Common Law (originally almost pure Case Law) is almost universally agreed
to have become fully established between the beginning of the reign of William the Conqueror as King of
England in 1066 and the end of the reign of Henry II of England in 1189.
4Hadeld (2007) systematically scrutinizes the key dierences between Common and Civil Law systems.
She then addresses the question of how these dierences aect the \dynamic quality" of the Law. We prefer
to stay with the safer distinction between Case and Statute Law, which suces for the purposes of this paper.Anderlini, Felli and Riboni 3
changes little unless the Statute Book itself is changed. If one were designing Civil Law and
Common Law from scratch, then it would be ecient to strive for more detailed legislation
in the Civil Law than in the Common Law world. If this were the case, in this re-designed
world, the distinction we make between Statute and Case Law would broadly correspond to
the distinction between Civil and Common Law.
Before we move on, it is also important to mention a large and inuential body of empirical
literature known as \Law and Finance" which examines the relative performance of Common
and Civil Law in Financial and related markets.5 We believe that our results lend support
to the main nding | namely that Common Law dominates Civil Law in this fast-paced
section of the economy. We return to this point in Section 5 which concludes the paper.
1.2. Preview and Relation to the Literature
We abstract completely from \judicial bias." This is not because we do not subscribe to the
\pragmatist" view of the judicial process that can be traced back to at least Cardozo (1921)
and subsequently Posner (2003).6 It is mainly to make sure that our results can be clearly
attributed to the source we focus on (rigidity versus time-inconsistency). Introducing judicial
bias may well have ambiguous eects on welfare when Courts have more discretion,7 because
it changes the incentives of the current Court to constrain future Courts via precedents.8
We also ignore the distinction between \lower" and \appellate" Courts. The eciency
rationale for the existence of an appeal system has receive vigorous scrutiny in recent years
(Daughety and Reinganum, 1999, 2000, Levy, 2005, Shavell, 1995, Spitzer and Talley, 2000,
amomg others), but, again, its dierential impact in the Case and Statute Law regimes is far
from obvious both theoretically and empirically. As with judicial bias, we prefer to maximize
the transparency of our results and leave the distinction out of the model. In our model,
5See for instance La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2005), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1997, 1998, 1999, 2002), Lombardo and Pagano (1999, 2002).
6There is a ourishing literature on the eects (and remedies for) judicial bias interpreted in a broad sense
that ranges from \idiosyncracies" in the judges' preferences Bond (2004a), Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007),
among others, to \corruption" of the Courts Ayres (1997), Bond (2004b), Legros and Newman (2002), among
others.
7We use the word discretion in the standard sense that it has acquired in Economics. Legal scholars are
often uneasy about the term. Another way to express the same concept would be to say that Case Law Courts
exercise \exibility." Given that Courts in our model are always welfare-maximizers, it would be appropriate
to say that, under Case Law, Courts exercise \exibility with a view to commercial interest." We are grateful
to Ross Cranston for making us aware of this terminological issue.
8See again Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007).Statute Law or Case Law? 4
under Case Law, all Courts have, in principle, the same ability to create precedents that
aect future Courts. Clearly, in reality, appellate Courts dier from lower Courts in this
respect. Nevertheless we proceed as we do in the belief that the general avor of our results
would survive in a richer model.9
Our interest is in the comparison of the regimes of Case and Statute Law in the economic
sphere of course, particularly within the realm of what economists call Contract Theory.
During the last two decades, since the seminal work of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart
and Moore (1990), much energy has been devoted to the analysis of ex-ante contracting under
an incompleteness constraint.10 The focus is on a situation in which ex-ante contracting is
critical to the parties' incentives to undertake relationship-specic investments that enhance
economic eciency. The parties' ability to contract on the relevant variables is assumed to
be incomplete. This has proved to be an extremely fertile ground to address a variety of issue
of rst-order economic importance.11
We model both the Statute Law regime and the Case Law regime in a way that is designed
to bring the dierences into stark relief, more than capture the fact that the distinction
between the two can often be subtle and hard to pinpoint precisely. Our model comprises a
heterogeneous \pool" of ex-ante contracts; a draw from this pool materializes each period.
Under Case Law, in each period a Court of Law can, in principle, decide to either void or
uphold the parties' contract.12 Our model is designed so that, from the point of view of
ex-ante welfare, it is optimal to void certain contracts, while the remainder should be upheld.
Under Statute Law, all Courts are constrained to behave in the same way (by the relevant
part of the \Statute Book"). Thus, under Statute Law, either all contracts are upheld, or
they are all voided. Under Case Law, each Court may be either constrained by precedents
9For instance Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007) insist, realistically, that the Court that changes the relevant
body of precedents is an appellate Court. Their appellate Courts are, by assumption, immune from the
potential time-inconsistency problem we identify here. Provided that appellate Courts suer at least to some
extent from the same potential time-inconsistency problem as our lower Courts, the general avor of our
results would be unaected by an explicit distinction between these two levels of judgement.
10See Kaplow and Shavell (2002a), Section 4, for a general discussion of incomplete contracts and enforce-
ment.
11To cite but a few contributions, this literature has shed light on vertical and lateral integration (Grossman
and Hart, 1986), the allocation of ownership over physical assets (Hart and Moore, 1990), the allocation of
authority (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) and power (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) in organizations.
12Note that we are therefore ruling out the possibility that the Court might change the terms of the
contract, while enforcing some of its basic provisions. On this point, see Kaplow (2000) and Kaplow and
Shavell (2002a).Anderlini, Felli and Riboni 5
(which evolve according to a dynamic process specied below) or unconstrained.13 In the
latter case the Case Law Court has complete discretion to either void or uphold the parties
contract.
Our point of departure is the observation that under Case Law, whenever a Court of Law
exercises discretion it does so necessarily ex-post. It is hard to argue with the view that
Courts (if at all) intervene ex-post in the parties' contractual relationship.14
In the class of contracting problems on which we focus, this has far-reaching implications
for the behavior of Courts under Case Law. Under Case Law, when a Court exercises dis-
cretion on whether to void or uphold the parties' contract, the ex-ante incentives to invest
no longer matter because the parties' investments and strategic decisions are sunk. This bi-
ases the Court's decision away from ex-ante eciency (in our stylized model always towards
enforcing the parties' contract). In short, under Case Law, because they exercise discretion
(when they in fact do) ex-post, the Courts suer from a time-inconsistency problem. If they
just maximized the (ex-post) welfare of the current contracting parties, they would uphold
those contracts that it is optimal to void ex-ante. Under Case Law, the Courts' decisions
may suer from present-bias.15
Under Case Law, the Courts' bias towards excessive upholding is mitigated, although
not entirely resolved, by the dynamics of precedents. Each Court is tempted to uphold the
parties' contract even when it should not do so. However, voiding the contract of the current
contracting parties, via the dynamics of precedents, increases the probability that future
13In reality, of course, it is seldom the case that a Case Law Court is either completely constrained or
completely unconstrained by precedents. Each case has many dimensions, and precedents can have more or
less impact according to how \tting" they are to the current case. We model this complex interaction in a
simple way. With a certain probability existing precedents \apply," and with the complementary probability
existing precedents simply \do not apply." We do not believe that the main avor of our results would change
in a richer model capturing more closely this complex interaction, although the latter obviously remains an
important target for future research.
14In a pioneering paper, Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) compare Common Law (Independent Juries) and
Civil Law (Bright Line Rules) in a static model. Ponzetto and Fernandez (2006) compare Case Law and
Statute Law in a dynamic setting with a focus on the evolution of precedents and cross-country comparisons.
Aside from a variety of modeling choices, the key dierence between their work and ours is the fact that we
concentrate on the potential time-inconsistency generated by ex-post Court intervention.
15The term \time-inconsistency" is a standard piece of modern economic jargon that goes back to at least
Strotz (1956) and subsequently to the classic contributions of Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Kydland and
Prescott (1977). It can be used whenever an ex-ante decision is potentially reversed ex-post. The term
\present-bias" describes well the type of time-inconsistency that aicts the Case Law Courts in our set-up.
We use the two terms in a completely interchangeable way.Statute Law or Case Law? 6
Courts will be constrained to do the same, thus raising ex-ante welfare. The decision of each
Court to void or uphold is pinned down by the trade-o between an instantaneous gain from
upholding, and a future gain, via precedent-setting, from voiding the parties' contract.
Our rst main nding is that the time-inconsistency problem prevents the Case Law
regime from reaching full eciency. This, surprisingly, is true under very general conditions
on the dynamics of precedents, and regardless of the rate at which the future is discounted.16
Eventually, under Case Law, the Courts must succumb to the present-bias. This is because
they trade o a present increase in (ex-post) welfare, which does not shrink as time goes
by, against a marginal eect on the decisions of future Courts. The latter eventually shrinks
to be arbitrarily small. As a corollary, it is then relatively straightforward to argue that if
the heterogeneity of the pool of cases that comes before the Courts is \suciently small,"
then Statute Law will be superior to Case Law. The loss from a Statute Law xed rule will
eventually become smaller than the loss from the time-inconsistency problem under Case
Law.
Our rst main nding relies on a characterization of the evolution of precedents through
time in a Case Law regime. At least since Cardozo (1921), the economic eciency properties
of this process have been the subject of intense scrutiny.17 In these writings, we often nd a
hypothesized \convergence" toward ecient rules under Case Law (Posner, 2004). How do
our result stack against this hypothesis then? Roughly speaking, we nd that, in our simple
model, on the one hand the evolution of precedents improves welfare through time,18 but on
the other does not yield ecient rules in the limit.
1.3. Overview
For ease of exposition, all proofs are in the Appendix. In the numbering of equations, Lemmas,
and so on, a prex of \A" indicates that the relevant item is in the Appendix.
16Provided it is positive.
17Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007) explicitly analyze how the process behaves dierently when judges are
allowed to \overrule" as opposed to when they are only allowed to \distinguish" relative to previous cases.
The selection of ecient rules under Case Law, based on the self-selection of cases that are brought before
Courts has been studied by Landes (1971), Priest (1977) and Rubin (1977) among others. More recently,
Ben-Shahar (1999) has argued that exibility may be detrimental in a Case Law regime on grounds entirely
separate from our considerations here. In short, he argues that the anticipation of Court exibility may give
incentives to the parties (the \right-holders") to over-invest in preventive (\anti-erosion") measures in the
contracts they write.
18This claim is made precise in Lemma A.1.Anderlini, Felli and Riboni 7
2. Time-Inconsistency: Three Leading Examples
Our point of departure is the observation that Courts examine the disputes brought before
them at an ex-post stage. Many decisions will have been taken and much uncertainty will
have been realized by the time a Court is asked to rule.
It is key to our results that the optimal decision for our benevolent Court may be dierent
when evaluated ex-ante, or at the actual ex-post stage. It is also important that this is not
always the case: the considerations that impact the ex-ante decision making it dier from
the ex-post one may be unimportant and the ex-post optimal Court ruling is optimal when
viewed from ex-ante as well.
There are many examples of spheres in which the potential time-inconsistency we work
with occurs. Here, we briey describe two of these that we think are both important and t
well our setup. In the next section, we report more extensively on a third example (Anderlini,
Felli, and Postlewaite, 2006) that also ts the bill. This is also briey described below.
Our rst example is related to the \topsy-turvy" principle in corporate nance (see Tirole,
2005, Ch.16). Project requiring nance can be of, say, high or low quality (ex-ante) and can
be hit or not by a liquidity crisis (ex-post). Socially, it is optimal to let only high quality
projects be nanced ex-ante. Lenders cannot observe project quality, nor can they distinguish
at an ex-post stage whether the borrower's state of distress is due to a low quality project or
a liquidity problem.
Providing maximum protection to the lenders so that all projects in distress are liquidated
achieves ex-ante selection in the sense that only high quality borrowers apply for funds. On
the other hand, for projects of high quality, the social cost of re-deploying resources in a
new activity after liquidation is high. Hence if only high quality projects are nanced in the
rst place, ex-post it is optimal to lower lenders' protection and allow debt-restructuring.
This avoids the social loss from redeploying resources away from high quality projects. The
ex-ante and ex-post optimal Court decisions may dier.
To complete the example, we observe that in some instances allowing debt restructuring
may be optimal both ex-ante and ex-post. This is the case, for instance, if all potential
projects are of high quality (or if the proportion of low quality projects is suciently low).
Our second example concerns patents. As in the rst cases, the specics could take a
variety of dierent forms, of which we only mention one. Consider a Court that examines aStatute Law or Case Law? 8
patent infringement case. From an ex-ante perspective, as is standard, the optimal breadth
of the patent will be determined taking into account the trade-o between the incentives
to invest in R&D, and the social cost of monopoly power exercised by the patent owner.
Ex-post, however, since the R&D investments are sunk, it is always socially optimal to rule
in favor of the infringer and thus open the market to competition. So, again, the optimal
decision for the Court may dier according to whether we look at the problem ex-ante or
ex-post.19
The model in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) (henceforth AFP) involves a buyer
and a seller in a multiple-widget model with relationship-specic investment, asymmetric
information and incomplete contracting.20 In this world, it may be optimal for a Court to
actively intervene in the parties' relationship and void some of the contracts that they may
want to write. This is because without Court intervention inecient pooling would obtain
in equilibrium, and an ex-ante announcement by the Court that it will intervene will destroy
the pooling equilibrium and hence raise welfare. On the other hand, once a contract has
been written and the parties have agreed which widget to trade, the optimal Court decision
at an ex-post stage is to let the contract stand so that the parties can in fact trade. While
intervention is optimal ex-ante, the opposite is true ex-post.21 In what follows we use a
numerical example of AFP to describe the static problem faced by an interventionist Court.
3. The Model
3.1. A Simple and a Rich Environment
As mentioned above, we here focus on a version of the model in AFP as the \contracting
stage" of our dynamic environment mostly to x ideas. The key features of the model used
here are that Court intervention is benecial in some cases and that ex-post the Court's
incentives are not to intervene when it in fact should from the point of view of ex-ante
19As before, in some cases the optimal decision is the same. When R&D investment is unimportant the
socially optimal breadth of the patent is zero. It is optimal both ex-ante and ex-post to rule in favor of the
infringer.
20As we mentioned before, this model is described in detail in the Appendix.
21As in the previous two examples, it is possible that the optimal decision both ex-ante and ex-post be that
the Court should not intervene. In the Appendix, we argue that this is the case if the number of potential
widgets is reduced.Anderlini, Felli and Riboni 9
welfare.22
The backdrop for our analysis is a numerical version of the parametric model in AFP,
with the added possibility that the environment may in fact be such that the Court should
uphold all contracts.
We refer to the latter as the \simple" environment (with fewer widgets, denoted F) and
to the former as the \rich" environment (with more widgets, denoted M). The environment
is F with probability 1    and is M with probability .
In both environments there is a buyer and a seller, both risk-neutral. The buyer has
private information on the costs and values of the relevant widgets. He can be of a \high"
type (denoted H) or of a \low" type (denoted L), with equal probability. The buyer knows
his type at the time of contracting, while the seller does not. As standard, there is an ex-ante
contracting stage, followed by an investment stage, followed by the ex-post trading stage. For
simplicity, at the ex-ante contracting stage the buyer has all the bargaining power, while the
seller has all the bargaining power ex-post.
In the simple environment there are two widgets, w1 and w2. These two widgets are
mutually exclusive because they require a widget- and relationship-specic investment of I
= 1 on the part of the buyer. The buyer can only undertake one investment, and the cost
and value of either widget without investment are zero. The cost and value of wi (i = 1;2)
(net of the ex-ante investment) if the buyer's type is  2 fL;Hg are denoted by c
i and v
i
respectively. When investment takes place we take each of them to be as follows
w1 w2
Type H vH
1 = 21; cH
1 = 1 vH
2 = 25; cH
2 = 1
Type L vL
1 =  1; cL
1 = 0 vL
2 = 3; cL
2 = 1
(1)
The rich environment is the same as the simple environment, save for the fact that a third
widget w3 is available. This widget is not contractible at the ex-ante stage, and does not
require any investment.23 Widget w3 can be traded ex-post via a \spot" contract. Trading
22The distinction between \forward looking" decisions (that maximize ex-ante welfare) and ones that focus
on the parties currently before the Court can be found in some of the extant literature. Kaplow and Shavell
(2002b) distinguish between \welfare" (ex-ante) and \fairness" (ex-post). Summers (1992) distinguishes
between \goal reasons" (ex-ante) \rightness reasons" (ex-post).
23In AFP we argue that the ex-ante non-contractibility of w3 is without loss of generality for the class ofStatute Law or Case Law? 10
w3 yields a positive surplus only if the buyer's type is L. We take the cost and values of the
three widgets in the rich environment to be
w1 w2 w3
Type H vH
1 = 21; cH
1 = 1 vH
2 = 25; cH
2 = 1 vH
3 = 76; cH
3 = 100
Type L vL
1 =  1; cL
1 = 0 vL
2 = 3; cL
2 = 1 vL
3 = 65; cL
3 = 3
(2)
The Court may intervene in the parties' contractual relationship by voiding contracts
for either w1 or w2.24 Because of the hold-up problem generated by the the widget- and
relationship-specic investment, if the Court voids contracts for either w1 or w2 or both, then
the corresponding widget will not be traded.
In the simple environment, the Court has no welfare-enhancing role to play. When all
contracts are enforced, in equilibrium both types of buyer invest in and trade w2. This yields
full social eciency. The total expected surplus from trading (net of investment) is 13.
Equilibria in the rich environment are fully characterized in AFP. When the Court enforces
all contracts, there is a unique equilibrium, which involves inecient pooling. Both types of
buyer invest in and trade w2, and, since the buyer's type is not revealed, they also trade w3
ex-post. The total expected surplus from trading (net of investment) in this case is 32. This
outcome is clearly short of social eciency since the type H buyer trades w3, which generates
negative surplus ( 24).
If instead the Court intervenes and voids contracts for w2, the two types of buyer separate:
behaving dierently, they reveal their private information at the ex-ante contracting stage.
The unique equilibrium outcome is that type H buyer invests in and trades w1, but does
not trade w3, while the type L buyer does not invest in and does not trade either w1 or
w2; he only trades w3 ex-post. In this case the total expected surplus from trading (net of
investment) is 41. While this outcome does not achieve full social eciency it dominates
the pooling outcome since it avoids the inecient trade of w3 from the part of the type H
buyer.25
contracts we consider here.
24In AFP we argue that not allowing the Court to void contracts for w3 is without loss of generality.
25Full social eciency in the rich environment would entail that both types of buyer invest in and trade w2,
while only the type L buyer trades w3 ex-post. The total expected surplus from trading (net of investment)
in this case would be 44.Anderlini, Felli and Riboni 11
In AFP it is also shown that voiding contracts for w2 is the best that the Court can do
in the rich environment.26
To sum up, if the environment is simple a welfare-maximizing Court can do no better
than not intervening at all. Intuitively, Court intervention has no value since disclosure of
the buyer's private information itself has no social value.
If instead the environment is rich then an active Court that intervenes and voids contracts
for w2 will enhance social welfare. By intervening, the Court induces the two types of buyer
to disclose information at the ex-ante contracting stage. This disclosure has positive social
value in the rich environment.
From now on, by a Court that voids (indicated by V) the parties' contract we mean a
Court that will void contracts for w2 (and uphold all others), while by a Court that upholds
(indicated by U) the parties' contract we mean a Court that will uphold all contracts.
3.2. The Full Static Environment
Consider rst the Case Law regime. In each period the environment is F (simple) with
probability 1    and is M (rich) with probability . Each contracting case (simple or rich)
comes equipped with its own specic legal characteristics, which determine, as we will explain
shortly, whether the current body of precedents apply.
We model the legal characteristics of the case as random variables `F and `M, each
uniformly distributed over [0;1], describing the legal characteristics of the case in the F
and M environments respectively.27 This allows us to specify the body of precedents in a
particularly simple way.
The body of precedents J is represented by four numbers in [0;1] so that J = (vF,
uF, vM, uM) with the restriction that vF  uF and vM  uM. Once the nature of the
environment (F or M) is determined, the legal characteristics of the case are determined (`F
or `M as appropriate).
26Recall that the Court can choose between voiding no contracts, voiding contracts for w1, voiding contracts
for w2 and voiding contracts for both w1 and w2. In AFP the case of mixed strategies for the Court is also
considered. We do not allow probabilistic Court choices in the present set-up.
27The fact that we take the legal characteristics of a contracting case to be represented by a single-
dimensional variable is obviously simplistic. While a richer model of this particular feature of a contract
would be desirable, it is completely beyond the scope of our analysis here. The modeling route we follow is
just the simplest one that will do the job in our set-up.Statute Law or Case Law? 12
The interpretation of J = (vF, uF, vM, uM) is straightforward. Once the legal character-
istics of the case are determined, the body of precedents is seen to either apply or not apply
and in which direction. Say that the environment is F, then if `F  vF the body of precedents
constrains the Court to void, if `F  uF the body of precedents constrains the Court uphold,
while if vF < `F < uF the Court has discretion over the case. A similar interpretation applies
if the environment is M so that the Court is constrained to void, constrained to uphold, or
has discretion according to whether `M  vM, `M  uM or vM < `M < uM.
In each period, the contracting parties observe the nature of the environment, the body
of precedents, and the legal characteristics of the case. Therefore, they know whether the
Court will be constrained by precedents or not and in which direction if so. They will also
correctly forecast the Court's decision if it has discretion. In other words, under Case Law,
in each of the environments, the parties anticipate correctly whether the Court will uphold
or void the contract.28
In the Statute Law environment the parties correctly anticipate what the Court will do
since it is constrained to either void or uphold all contracts | regardless of the environment.
In the four possible combinations of environment (F or M) and Court ruling (V or U) the
parties' behavior is easily determined. If the environment is F and the ruling is V, then the
parties will invest in and trade w1, with an expected (across buyer types) beginning-of-period
payo for the Court of (F;V) = 10. If the environment is F and the ruling is U, the parties
will invest in and trade w2 with an expected (across buyer types) beginning-of-period payo
for the Court of (F;U) = 13. If the environment is M and the ruling is V the parties will
separate as we described above and the expected (across buyer types) beginning-of-period
payo for the Court of is (M;V) = 41. If the environment is M and the ruling is U,
then inecient pooling obtains as we described above and the expected (across buyer types)
beginning-of-period payo for the Court of is (M;U) = 32.
Notice that the numbers we have posited clearly bear out the fact that in the F envi-
ronment the Court should uphold, while in the M environment the Court should void. The
28It should be emphasized that, despite their correct expectations, our parties always take their contract
to Court. The Court rules, and thus aects the body of precedents. This is obviously unappealing as an
assumption. We make it nevertheless as virtually all the extant literature does. Why, in equilibrium, and
therefore with \correct" expectations contracting parties go to Court is a key question that is ripe for formal
investigation. Nevertheless, it remains beyond the scope of this paper.Anderlini, Felli and Riboni 13
beginning-of-period expected payos trivially satisfy
3.3. The Statute Law Regime
Under Statute Law, the Courts are allowed no discretion. They are all bound to choose the
same ruling V or U, regardless of the environment being F or M. Under Statute Law the
Courts are commited to a particular | uncontingent | behavior.
Since it is straightforward, we move directly to the dynamic version of the model for the
Statute Law regime. Time is indexed by t = 0;1;2;::: A sequence of Courts face a stream
of (iid) parties. The planner's (the legislature's) discount factor is  2 (0;1). The optimal







t [(1   )(F;R) + (M;R)] (3)
The maximization problem in (3) is extremely simple since it is not genuinely dynamic.29
In fact, given the particular numbers in (??) it can easily be fully solved explicitly. We state
the following without proof.
Proposition 1. Statute Law Equilibrium Welfare: The maximized value of (3) is denoted
by WS(). We refer to this value as the equilibrium welfare of the Statute Law regime. The
ruling that solves the maximization problem (3) is denoted by RS(). We refer to this as the
equilibrium ruling under Statute Law.
The equilibrium ruling R = RS() is U for  between 0 and a threshold value 
S 2 (0;1)
and is V for  between 
S and 1. With the particular numbers in (??) we get 
S = 1=4.30
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. A single ruling, valid in all periods
and environments must be chosen. Given the structure of payos in (??) the payo to U is
larger in the F environment, while the payo to V is larger in the M environment. It then
follows that choosing U is optimal if the probability of the F environment is suciently large,
while choosing V is optimal if the probability of the M environment is suciently large.
29Problem (3) is clearly equivalent to maxR2fV;Ug (1   )(F;R) + (M;R).
30Clearly, when  = 
S both the V and U rulings solve problem (3). The threshold form of RS() does
not depend on the particular numbers involved, but only on the inequalities in (??). The value 
S = 1=4, on
the other hand, obviously depends on the particular numbers at hand.Statute Law or Case Law? 14
3.4. The Time-Inconsistent Court
Suppose that the Court is completely unable to commit to voiding or upholding the parties'
contract in either environment. Then the only equilibrium outcome in each period is that
the Court enforces the contract, and hence that the pooling equilibrium prevails.
To see this consider, in either environment, the subgame following the buyer's decision
to invest in w2, his oer of a contract for w2, which is accepted by the seller. At this point,
when the contract is brought to Court the buyer's investment is sunk, and hence the decision
of which widget to trade is irreversible.
If the Court were to void the contract, the parties will be unable to trade w2, and hence
the only expected surplus to materialize would be (using the numbers in (1) and (2)) 0 if the
environment is F (since no trade would take place) and 19 if the environment is M (from
the trade of w3 for both types of buyer).
If the Court were to uphold the contract on the other hand the surplus from w2 would
also materialize. In this case the Court's payo (again using the numbers in (1) and (2))
would be 14 if the environment is F (from the trade of w2 for both types of buyer) and 33 if
the environment is M (from the trade of both w2 and w3 for both types of buyer).31
Hence in either environment the Court ex-post would decide to enforce the parties' con-
tract. But as we pointed out in Subsection 3.1 above, if this is the case, the only equilibrium
outcome is the inecient pooling in which the buyer's type is not revealed.
We summarize the (continuation) payos to the Case Law Court in a given period, as of
the time it actually is called upon to decide whether to void or uphold the parties' contract
below for future reference.
In a nutshell, what we have just described is the source of the time-inconsistency problem
that will aict the Court in a Case Law regime. Viewed from the point at which it is called
upon to decide, the optimal decision for the Case Law Court is to uphold if the environment
is F, just as it is using the beginning-of-period payos in (??). However, viewed from the
point at which it is called upon to decide, the optimal decision for the Case Law Court is
to also uphold if the environment is M: the opposite than is the case using the expected
31Notice that in both cases we are describing what matters for the Court in the subgame, namely the
continuation payos (expected surplus). This is the reason for excluding the investment I = 1 from the
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beginning-of-period payos in (??). When the environment is M the \present-bias" tells the
Case Law Court to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the maximization of ex-ante
welfare.
3.5. The Case Law Regime: The Precedents Technology
In a Case Law environment each Court is subject to the present-bias \temptation" (potential
time-inconsistency) we described in Subsection 3.4 above. The temptation, however, is miti-
gated by the fact that each Court decision aects, via precedents, the decisions of subsequent
Courts.
We begin by describing how the precedents aect the degree of discretion that each Case
Law Court has.
As we described in Subsection 3.2, we think of the \body of precedents" at the beginning











M. The t-th Case Law Court is constrained
by precedents with probability 1   dt
F and 1   dt
M in each environment respectively. For
simplicity, we assume that if this is the case, the body of precedents does not change between
period t and period t + 1 so that J t+1 = J t.
When a Case Law Court is not constrained by precedents (given J t this happens with
probability dt
F in environment F and with probability dt
M in environment M), it can choose
to void or uphold the parties' contract at its discretion, according to whether the environment
is F or M. A Case Law Court that exercises discretion can also choose the breadth of its
ruling. We take this to be a single number bt 2 [0;1], with bt = 0 interpreted as a maximally
narrow ruling, and bt = 1 as a maximally broad one.
The discretionary ruling Rt 2 fV;Ug of the t-th Case Law Court and the state of the
environment Et 2 fF;Mg, together with the breadth of its ruling determine how the body
of precedents J t is modied to yield the J t+1 in which the t + 1-th Case Law Court will
operate.
Therefore, the precedents technology in the Case Law regime can be viewed as a map J :
[0;1]5  fV;Ug  fF;Mg ! [0;1]4, so that J t+1 = J(J t;bt;Rt;Et).
Typically, the map J will embody the workings of a complex set of legal mechanisms
and constitutional arrangements. It will also embody complex interaction eects that go,Statute Law or Case Law? 16
for instance from a broad upholding in, say, state F to an increased probability that future
Courts will be forced to uphold contracts in state M.
Somewhat surprisingly, we are able to carry out most of the analysis imposing a rather
weak structure on J.
Assumption 1. Dynamics of Precedents: The map J satises the following conditions:
(i) (Residual Discretion) Assume that J t is such that dt
M > 0 and dt
F > 0. Then J t+1 =
J(J t;bt;Rt;Et) is such that d
t+1
M > 0 and d
t+1
F > 0, whatever the values of bt, Rt and Et.
(ii) (Zero Breadth) For any ruling Rt and any environment Et, we have that J t = J(J t;0;
Rt; Et) (so that in this case J t+1 = J t).
The rst condition in Assumption 1 simply asserts that the inuence of precedents is
never able to take discretion completely away from future Courts. This seems a compelling
element of the very essence of a Case Law regime.
The second condition in Assumption 1 states that, regardless of the ruling it issues and
of the environment, any Case Law Court can ensure (setting bt = 0) that the breadth of its
ruling is small enough so as to have no eect on future Courts. This condition merits some
further comments.
First of all, the \zero breadth" condition of Assumption 1 greatly simplies the technical
side of our analysis. In particular it implies certain monotonicity properties of the dynamics
of the Case Law regime that are used our arguments below. It should also be noted, however,
that, while our characterization of equilibrium does, the basic trade-o between the present-
bias temptation and the precedents eect does not depend on the availability of zero breadth
rulings in the Case Law regime.
Finally, the possibility that a Case Law regime Court might decide to narrow down on
purpose the precedential eect that its ruling has on future cases does correspond to reality.
For instance in the US, a commonly used formula is for a Court to declare that they wish
to \restrict the holding to the facts of the case." In some other instances the Court may
choose not to publish the opinion in an ocial Reporter. Unpublished opinions are collected
by various services and so are available to lawyers. The decision not to publish in an ocial
Reporter, however, is regarded by future Courts as a signal that the Court does not want its
decision to have precedential value.32
32We are indebted to Alan Schwartz for useful guidance on these points.Anderlini, Felli and Riboni 17
We assume that all Case Law Courts are forward looking in the sense that they assign
weight 1  to the current payo, weight (1 )  to the per-period Court payo in the next
period, weight (1   ) 2 to the per-period Court payo in the period after, and so on.
The t-th period Case Law Court inherits J t from the past. Given J t, it rst observes
the state of the environment Et 2 fF;Mg, then it observes the outcome of the draw that
determines the legal characteristics of the case (`F or `M as appropriate, as described in
Subsection 3.2 above). Together with J t, this determines whether the t-th period Case Law
Court has discretion or not. If it has discretion, the t-th Case Law Court then chooses Rt
and bt, the ruling (void or uphold), and its breadth. Together with Et and J t this determines
J t+1, and hence the decision problem faced by the t + 1-th period Case Law Court.
Notice that the payos and hence the behavior of the period-t Case Law Court are aected
by the behavior of the t-th period contracting parties and by all subsequent buyers and sellers.
The behavior of the period-t contracting parties follows the pattern we described in Subsection
3.2 above. If the Court is constrained in one direction or the other, then the parties will know
this since they observe J t and the realization of the relevant legal characteristics variable
(`t
F or `t
M, depending on the environment). As a result in the four possible combinations of
environment (F or M) and (precedents-determined) ruling (U or V) they will behave exactly
as we described in Subsection 3.2 above, yielding beginning-of-period-t payos to the Court
as in (??).
Whenever the t-th Case Law Court is not constrained by precedents, in equilibrium its
behavior will be determined by the trade-o between the present-bias we described in Sub-
section 3.4 and the eect of its decision, via precedents, on the decisions of future Courts. In
equilibrium, however, it will also be the case that the period-t contracting parties can antic-
ipate how the t-th Case Law Court will decide to rule in the face of this trade-o. In other
words, in equilibrium the Court's decision will be correctly anticipated by the contracting
parties even when the legal characteristics of the case imply that the precedents do not bind
the Court's decision in any way. In short, in equilibrium, the beginning-of-period-t Court
payos will be as in (??), depending on the ruling-environment pair, regardless of whether
the t-th period Case Law Court is constrained by precedents or not.
Some new notation is necessary at this point to describe the strategy of the Case Law
Courts when they are not constrained by precedents. The t-th Case Law Court choice ofStatute Law or Case Law? 18
ruling Rt depends on both J t and Et. We let Rt = R(J t;Et) denote this part of the Court's
strategy. Similarly, we let the Court's (contingent) choice of breadth be denoted by bt =
b(J t;Et). Notice that, in principle, the choices of the t-th Case Law Court could depend on
the entire history of past rulings, breadths, environments, legal characteristics (including the
ones at time t) and parties' behavior. We restrict attention to behavior that depends only
on the body of precedents J t and the type of environment Et. These are clearly the only
\payo relevant" state variables for the t-th Case Law Court. In this sense our restriction is
equivalent to saying that we are restricting attention to the set of so-called Markov-Perfect
Equilibria.33. We will do so throughout the rest of the paper.
With this restriction, we can simply refer to the strategy of the Case Law Court, regardless
of the time period t. This will sometime be written concisely as  = (R;b). Given J t and
, the expected payo (as of the beginning of period t) to the t-th Case Law Court in period
t, using our new notation and the one in (??), can be written as follows.
(J t;;) =
(1   )fvt








The interpretation of (4) is straightforward. The rst two terms that multiply (1 ) refer
to the cases in which the Court is constrained (to void and to uphold respectively) in the F
environment. The third term that multiplies (1 ) is the Court's payo in the F environment
given its discretionary ruling R(J t;F). Similarly, the rst two terms that multiply  refer
to the cases in which the Court is constrained (to void and to uphold respectively) in the
M environment. The third and nal term that multiplies  is the Court's payo in the M
environment given its discretionary ruling R(J t;M).
Given the (stationary) preferences we have postulated, the overall payos to each Case
Law Courts can be expressed in a familiar recursive form. Let a  be given. Let Z(J t;;)
33See Maskin and Tirole (1994), Maskin and Tirole (2001) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Ch.13. It is also
worth noting that in an environment aected by a time-inconsistency problem like the one we have here, the
existence of such equilibria is not straightforward. In many cases equilibria will in fact involve randomized
choices, possibly conditional on publicly observable correlation devices. A full discussion of this point is well
beyond the scope of the present paper. Suce it to say that we do have \existence results" that show that
the set of equilibria which we are characterizing below is in fact not empty. Details are available from the
authors on request.Anderlini, Felli and Riboni 19
be the expected overall payo (as of the beginning of the period) to the t-th Case Law Court,
given J t and the sequence of strategies .34 We can then write this payo as follows.
Z(J t;;) = (1   ) (J t;t;)+
 [(1   )(1   dt
F) + (1   dt
M)] Z(J t;;)+
 (1   )dt
F Z(J(J t;b(J t;F);R(J t;F);F);;)+
 dM Z(J(J t;b(J t;M);R(J t;M);M);;)
(5)
The interpretation of (5) is also straightforward. The rst term on the right-hand side
is the Court's period-t payo. The rst term that multiplies  is the Court's continuation
payo if its ruling turns out to be constrained by precedents so that J t+1 = J t. The second
term that multiplies  is the Court's continuation payo if the environment at t turns out
to be F and the Court's decisions at t are [R(J t;F);b(J t;F)], while the third term that
multiplies  is the Court's continuation payo if the environment at t turns out to be M and
the Court's decisions at t are [R(J t;M);b(J t;M)].
Now recall that the t-th Case Law Court decides wether to void or uphold the contract (if
it is given discretion) and chooses the breadth of its ruling after the nature of the environment
(F or M) is known and after the buyer's investment is sunk, and hence the decision of which
widget to trade is irreversible. Hence the t-th Case Law Court continuation payos viewed
from the time it is called upon to rule will have two components. The one that embodies the
period-t payo will be as in (??) reecting the Court's present-bias in the M environment.
The one that embodies the Court's payos from period t+1 onwards on the other hand will
be as in (5) (with time indices shifted forward by 1 of course) since all the relevant decisions
still lie ahead as far as the period-t Case Law Court is concerned.
It follows that, given J t and , the optimal decisions of the t-th Case Law Court can
be characterized as follows. Suppose that the t-th Case Law Court is not constrained by
precedents to either void or uphold the parties' contract.35 Then, the values of Rt = R(J t;Et)
34Note that, as a function, Z() is independent of t because we are restricting attention to Markov-Perfect
Equilibria.
35Recall that if the ruling turns out to be constrained by precedents, the t-th Case Law Court does not
make any choice and the body of precedents remains the same so that J t+1 = J t.Statute Law or Case Law? 20
2 fV;Ug and bt = b(J t;Et) 2 [0;1] must solve
max
Rt2fV;Ug;bt2[0;1]











It is now straightforward to dene what constitutes an equilibrium in the Case Law regime.
Denition 1. Case Law Equilibrium Behavior: An equilibrium under the Case Law regime
is a  = [R;b] such that, for every t = 0;1;2:::, for every Et 2 fF;Mg and for every
possible J t, the pair [R(J t;Et);b(J t;Et)] is a solution to36
max
Rt2fV;Ug;bt2[0;1]











For any given Equilibrium Behavior as in Denition 1 we can compute the value of the
expected payo to the Case Law Court of period t = 0, as a function of the initial value J 0.
Using the notation we already established, this is denoted by Z(J 0;;).
We denote by WC(J 0;) the supremum of Z(J 0;;) taken over all possible equilib-
ria of the Case Law regime. With optimistic terminology, we refer to WC(J 0;) as the
equilibrium welfare of the Case Law regime given J 0.
4. The Possibility of Statute Law Dominance
4.1. Evolving Case Law and Mature Case Law
Given  and an initial body of precedents J 0, as the randomness in each period is realized
(the nature of the environment, whether the precedents bind or not, and how) a sequence of
Court rulings will also be realized.
The realized number of times that the Case Law Courts have discretion and will void (V)
the parties' contract has an upper bound. Case Law eventually \matures," and all Case Law
Courts will eventually succumb to the (time-inconsistent) temptation to rule U.
Proposition 2. Evolving and Mature Case Law: Let any equilibrium  for the Case Law
regime be given.
36It should be noted that in equilibrium the decision of the t-th Case Law Court is required to be optimal
given every possible J t, and not just those that have positive probability given  and J 0. This is a standard
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Then, there exists an integer m, which depends on  but not on J 0, on , or on the
particular equilibrium , with the following property.
Along any realized path of uncertainty, the number of times that the Case Law Courts
have discretion and rule V does not exceed m.
Intuitively, each time a Case Law Court rules V, it must be that the future gains from
constraining future Courts via precedents exceed the instantaneous gain the Court can reap
by succumbing to the ex-post temptation to rule U. While the temptation remains constant
through time, the eect on future Courts must eventually become small. As the state of
precedents becomes more and more binding on future Courts, the gains from one more V
ruling shrink.
The state of precedents in the Case Law regime eventually becomes mature so that future
Courts are already likely to be constrained not to give in to the present-bias temptation to
rule U. At this point, Case Law Courts will stop ruling V whenever they have the discretion
to do so.
4.2. Welfare Comparison
The present-bias temptation to uphold when the environment is M lowers the equilibrium
welfare under the Case Law Regime. Eventually Case Law becomes mature as in Proposition
2. This eect is obviously larger when  is larger so that the rich environment M is more
likely to obtain.
At the same time, when  is extreme (near 0 or near 1), the lack of exibility of the
Statute Law regime becomes less and less important. The decision that is optimal for the
environment that obtains almost all the time is also almost optimal in expected terms.
Putting these two considerations together leads us to our main result.
Proposition 3. Statute Law Welfare Dominance: The Statute Law regime yields
strictly higher equilibrium welfare than the Case Law regime for high values of .
More specically, let any J 0 be given, and assume that this leaves positive discretion to




Then there exists a 
C 2 (0;1) such that for every  2 (
C;1] we have that WS() >
WC(J 0;).37
37In general, 
C depends on J 0.Statute Law or Case Law? 22
When the environment changes suciently slowly ( suciently large), Statute Law dom-
inates Case Law.
4.3. Case Law Dominance
Proposition 3 establishes that in some cases the Statute Law regime is superior to the Case
Law one. In the framework we have set up, there are obviously cases in which the reverse is
true. We discuss these cases informally to avoid setting up a considerable amount of extra
notation.
Notice that there is nothing in our Assumption 1 about the dynamics of precedents that
guarantees that these will evolve in the obvious intuitive way when the Case Law Courts take
their decisions. These \monotonicity" conditions would essentially guaranteed that a ruling
(of positive breadth) of R in environment E makes it more likely that future Case Law Courts
are constrained to issue the same ruling in the given environment E, and less likely that they
will be constrained to issue the opposite ruling. A natural additional condition is that every
time a Case Law Court issues a ruling with \suciently high" breadth in an environment E
then the likelihood that future Case Law Courts have discretion in the same environment E
is reduced.
The monotonicity conditions we have sketched are not in general sucient to conclude
that equilibrium welfare will be superior under Case Law than under Statute Law, even
for intermediate values of  representing a fast-changing heterogeneous environment. Two
further elements are necessary for the conclusion.
The rst is rather unsurprising: the rate at which the future is discounted by each Case
Law Court must not be too high. This is because the only discipline against each Court's
temptation to rule U is only embodied in future rewards.
The second is a more novel consideration as far as we are aware. The degree of \spillover"
of precedents from one environment to the other must not be too high. As an illustration,
consider the case in which a ruling with positive breadth of V in environment M has two
eects: to raise the probability that future Case Law Courts are constrained to rule V in
environment M (a \direct" eect), and to raise even more the probability that future Case
Law Courts are constrained to rule V in environment F (a \spillover" eect). While the
direct eect is welfare enhancing, the spillover eect is not. This is because the best rulingAnderlini, Felli and Riboni 23
(both ex-ante and ex-post) in environment F is in fact U. It is then not hard to see that if
spillover eects are suciently strong it could well be the case that, even for intermediate
values of , equilibrium welfare under Statute Law is superior.
The conditions of monotonicity, low discounting and not excessive spillovers seem emi-
nently plausible in many cases. However, it is interesting to remark that several intertwined
conditions need to be met to overcome the time-inconsistency problem in the Case Law
regime.
5. Conclusions
Courts intervene in contractual relationships at the ex-post stage (if at all). Because of
sunk investments and strategic decisions this generates a time-inconsistent present-bias in
the decisions of Courts that can exercise discretion.
This observation has wide-ranging implications for the hypothesis that Case Law evolves
towards ecient decisions. In a Case Law regime, each Court will trade o its current
temptation to take an inecient decision dictated by its present bias with the eect that
its decision has on future Case Law Courts, via precedents. We nd that under general
circumstances | discretion never shrinks to zero, and the possibility of zero-breadth rulings
that have no eect on the future | this eectively prevents Case Law from reaching full
eciency. Eventually, the eect via precedents must become small since it is a marginal
one. The temptation to take the inecient decision on the other hand remains constant
through time. Hence, at some point Case Law \matures" in the sense that precedents are
already very likely to constrain future Courts to take the ecient decision. This undoes the
incentives to set the \right" precedents whenever the present Court has the chance to do
so. Bounded away from full eciency, Case Law stops evolving and settles into, narrow,
inecient decisions whenever precedents do not bind.
Once the propensity of Case Law to succumb to time-inconsistency is established, it is
natural to ask the question of whether an inexible regime of Statute Law in which Courts
never have any discretion is superior in some cases. Even though we model the Statute
Law regime in an extreme way | no exibility at all | we nd that Statute Law does
indeed dominate in some cases. In particular if the environment changes suciently slowly
(is suciently homogeneous) so that the inexibility of Statute Law carries a suciently low
cost, then it will dominate the Case Law regime in welfare terms.Statute Law or Case Law? 24
Our ndings are consistent with the idea that Case Law would dominate in highly dynamic
sectors of the economy (e.g. Finance, Information Technology),38 while Statute Law would
yield higher welfare in the slow-paced sectors of the economy (e.g. Agriculture, Inheritance).
Appendix
Lemma A.1: Let  be an equilibrium for the Case Law regime. Then expected welfare is weakly mono-
tonically increasing in the sense that for any J 2 [0;1]4 and any E 2 fF;Mg we have that
Z(J(J;b(J;E);R(J;E);E);;)  Z(J;;) (A.1)




(1   ) b (E;R) +  fZ(J(J;b;R;E);;)g (A.2)
Suppose now that for some J and some E inequality (A.1) were violated. Then, using (ii) of Assumption 1,
setting b = 0 yields
Z(J;;) = Z(J(J;0;R(J;E);E);;) > Z(J(J;b(J;S);R(J;E);E);;) (A.3)
and hence
b (E;R(J;E)) +  fZ(J(J;0;R(J;E);E);;)g >
b (E;R(J;E)) +  fZ(J(J;b(J;E);R(J;E);E);;)g
(A.4)
which contradicts the fact that b(J;E) and R(J;E) must solve (A.2).
Lemma A.2: Let  be an equilibrium for the Case Law regime. Suppose that for some J 2 [0;1]4 and E
2 fF;Mg we have that
R(J;E) = V (A.5)
then it must be that39




b (E;U)   b (E;V)
i
(A.6)
38Rajan and Zingales (2003) present evidence that Common Law countries only develop better nancial
systems than Civil Law ones after 1913. Our model would be consistent with this observation if one could
argue that the rate at which the nancial sector environment changes accelerated suciently around that
time. This is not the explanation put forth by Rajan and Zingales (2003) (who focus on the political economy
of the problem), but in our view one worthy of future research.
39Recall that with the particular number at hand (see (??)) we have that b (F;U)  b (F;V) = b (M;U) 
b (M;V) = 14.Anderlini, Felli and Riboni 25
Proof: From (7) of Denition 1, we know that for every J 2 [0;1]4 and any E 2 fF;Mg the values b =
b(J;E) and R = R(J;E) must solve
max
R2fV;Ug;b2[0;1]
(1   ) b (E;R) +  fZ(J(J;b;R;E);;)g (A.7)
Since (A.5) must hold it must then be that
(1   )b (E;V) +  fZ(J(J;b(J;E);R(J;E);E);;)g 
(1   )b (E;R(J;U)) +  fZ(J(J;0;R(J;E);E);;)g
(A.8)
Using (ii) of Assumption 1 we know that Z(J(J;0;R(J;E);E);;) = Z(J;;). Hence (A.8) directly
implies (A.6).












b (E;U)   b (E;V)
i + 1 (A.9)
Notice next that Z(J;;) is obviously bounded above by maxE2fF;Mg;R2fV;Ug (E;R) and below by
minE2fF;Mg;R2fV;Ug (E;R).
Suppose now that the proposition were false and therefore that along some realized history ht = (J 0;
:::; J t 1) the Case Law Court were given discretion and ruled V for m or more times. Then using Lemmas
A.1 and A.2 we must have that










Using (A.9), it is immediate that the right-hand side of (A.10) is greater than maxE2fF;MgR2fV;Ug (E;R).
Since the latter is an upper bound for Z(J;;), this is a contradiction and hence it is enough to establish
the claim.
Proof of Proposition 3: Fix an initial body of precedents J 0 and a  2 (0;1). Fix a  2 (0;1), and for
every  2 [;1] x an equilibrium (given J 0) for the Case Law regime ().









t=0 with the following properties. First Et = M for every t = 0;:::;m   1. Second, if we let




M()) for every t = 0;:::;m 1 and for every  2 [;1]. In other words, along the realized path,
40With the actual numbers in (??) and (??) the numerator of (A.9) equals 30, and the denominator equals
14(1   )=.Statute Law or Case Law? 26
the environment is M and the Case Law Court has discretion in every period up to and including t = m 1,
for every equilibrium () with  2 [;1].
Next, we argue that this path has positive probability, bounded away from zero, provided that  2
[;1]. To see this, observe rst that the probability that the environment is M in periods t = 0;:::;m  





M() is given by the realized history hm(). Therefore, if we let d(m) =
inf2[;1] d(m;) the probability of the entire path with the requisite properties is bounded below by m d(m).
Trivially, the rst term of this product is bounded away from zero, provided that  2 [;1]. To see that d(m)
> 0, notice that since J 0 by assumption has d0
M > 0, and m is nite, then using (i) of Assumption 1 we have
that for some d > 0 it must be that dt
M() > d for every t = 0;:::;m 1 and every  2 [;1]. It follows that
the entire path with the requisite properties must have probability, call it , that is no smaller than m d
m >
0.
Next, we consider two cases. Fix a  2 [;1]. Along the positive probability path we have identied, in
the equilibrium (), either all the Case Law Courts' rulings are V or they are not. Suppose rst that all the
rulings are V. Then by Proposition 2 it must be that in the () equilibrium we have R(J m 1();M) =
U. If one or more rulings along the path are dierent from V then clearly in the () we have R(J t();M)
= U for some t = 0;:::;m   1.
We can now conclude that in any () equilibrium with  2 [;1], with probability  > 0, some Case
Law Court at time t  m   1 issues a ruling of U in environment M.
Using (??), it is immediate that the welfare of any Case Law Court equilibrium cannot go above that
generated by a sequence of rulings that are U whenever the environment in F and V whenever the environment
is M. Therefore, we can conclude that in any () equilibrium with  2 [;1] the welfare of the Case Law
regime is bounded above as follows41




t [(1   )(F;U) + (M;V)]+
m 1 [(1   )(F;U) + (   )(M;V) +  (M;U)]+
1 X
t=m
t [(1   )(F;U) + (M;V)]
)
(A.11)
Now consider any  > maxf;
Sg where 
S is as in Proposition 1. Using Proposition 1 the equilibrium
welfare WS() of the Statute Law Regime is
WS() = (1   )
1 X
t=0
t [(1   )(F;V) + (M;V)] (A.12)
41The rst sum of terms in (A.11) is understood to be zero if m = 1.Anderlini, Felli and Riboni 27











then for every  > 
C it is the case that WS() > WC(), as required.
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